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The Kaldor-Hicks (KH) criterion has long been the standard for benefit-cost analysis, but 
it has also been widely criticized for ignoring equity and, arguably, moral sentiments in general. 
We suggest replacing KH with an aggregate measure called KHM, where the M stands for moral 
sentiments. KHM simply adds to the traditional KH criterion the requirement that any good for 
which there is a willingness to pay or accept count as an economic good. This suggested 
expansion of KH, however, must confront objections to counting moral sentiments in general 
and non-paternalistic altruism in particular. We show that these concerns are unwarranted and 
suggest that the KHM criterion is superior to KH because it provides better information. 
   1
An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 




The Kaldor-Hicks (KH) criterion arose out of discussions among prominent British 
economists during the late 1930s.
1 Before that time it was generally assumed that each individual 
had an "equal capacity for enjoyment" and that gains and losses among different individuals 
could be directly compared (Mishan, 1981, pp. 120-121; Hammond 1985, p. 406). Robbins 
(1932, 1938) disturbed this view by arguing that interpersonal comparisons of utility were 
unscientific. Kaldor (1939, pp. 549-550) acknowledged Robbins’ (1938, p. 640) point about the 
inability to make interpersonal utility comparisons on any scientific basis, but suggested it could 
be made irrelevant. He suggested that, when a policy led to an increase in aggregate real income, 
 …the economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question 
of the comparability of individual satisfaction, since in all such cases it is possible 
to make everybody better off than before, or at any rate to make some people 
better off without making anybody worse off.  
Kaldor went on to note (1939, p. 550) that whether such compensation should take place 
“is a political question on which the economist, qua economist, could hardly pronounce an 
opinion.”
2 Hicks (1939) accepted this approach, which came to be called KH. 
Thus, it came to be thought that including considerations of income distribution or of 
compensation would involve interpersonal utility comparisons, and that such comparisons should 
be avoided by excluding consideration of actual compensation or of income distribution.
3 It was 
thought that this exclusion would lead to a measure of efficiency that was more scientific.
4  
KH separates efficiency and equity and proposes to leave the latter to the politicians. 
Undoubtedly there is some merit in separate accounting, but it does not follow that economists 
                                                 
1 These economists were Robbins, Hicks, Kaldor, and Harrod, all writing in the Economic Journal. 
2 It was thought that politicians or non-economists should make judgments and decisions about income distribution 
effects. 
3 As will be seen, economists’ commendable but impossible efforts to avoid interpersonal utility comparisons 
created additional problems.    2
should refrain from providing information on equity and on moral sentiments. Increasingly, 
economists have not refrained (e.g. Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997; Office of 
Management and Budget, 2003).  
The modern version of KH may be reasonably characterized by the following 
assumptions: (1) every dollar is treated the same regardless of who receives it, i.e., equal 
marginal utility of income;
5 (2) a project is efficient if it passes the Potential Compensation Test 
(PCT), i.e., if the winners could hypothetically compensate the losers (Kaldor, 1939, pp. 549-
550);
6 (3) gains are measured by willingness to pay (WTP) and losses by willingness to accept 
(WTA); and (4) equity effects are to be disregarded. More controversial is whether or not moral 
sentiments, under which equity effects are a sub-category, are to be excluded in a KH test. To 
ignore moral sentiments imposes a substantial cost—it amounts, for example, to a dismissal of 
existence values in those instances in which they arise from moral sentiments. This topic is of 
interest because analyses that include moral sentiments can differ materially from those that do 
not (Portney, 1994). 
  
2. An Aggregate Measure 
 
In so far as KH excludes moral sentiments, it excludes goods that can in fact be valued in 
the same manner that KH values other goods. That is, KH excludes some goods for which there 
is a WTP.
7 A logical extension or clarification of KH requires including all goods for which 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Many economists have ignored the normative nature of any efficiency criterion. See, for example, the criticisms of 
economic efficiency and economists’ use of it in the Hofstra Law Review volumes 8 and 9 and in volume 8 of the 
Journal of Legal Studies.  
5 There are a number of recommendations that benefit-cost analysis incorporate distributional weights, e.g., 
Feldstein (1974), who proposes that the weights be inversely proportional to income. Thus benefit-cost analysis has 
long entertained practices that imply a declining marginal utility of income. 
6 Subsequently Tibor de Scitovszky (1941) (who later used the name Scitovsky) suggested an additional potential 
compensation test, according to which a project is acceptable when the potential losers could not bribe the potential 
winners to not undertake the project (Zerbe and Dively, 1994, p. 97).  The KH criterion takes the status quo as the 
starting point and the Scitovsky version takes the new situation as the starting point. When KH is applied to both end 
states it satisfies both versions of the PCT, the Kaldor version and the Scitovsky version. Thus we shall use the term 
KH to refer to both versions. It would be more accurate to call the sum of the equivalent variations the Scitovsky 
criterion, but this is awkward as he suggested that both versions of the PCT need to be satisfied and this double 
criterion is known as the Scitovsky criterion. For additional information, see Roger McCain’s statement on this in 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/economics/sci.econ.research/Monthly.compilations/ser.94.aug.1-114. 
7 We do not deal here with the question of when WTP is a better or worse measure than willingness to accept 
(WTA). That is, we do not assume that moral sentiments should be measured by WTP rather than WTA. This issue 
is discussed elsewhere (Zerbe, 2001).    3
there is a WTP. Such an extension of KH we call an “aggregate measure” or KHM.
8 KHM 
recognizes that there will be a WTP for some of the values reflected in moral sentiments; these 
WTP measures of moral sentiments receive a weight of one across different individuals, just as is 
done for other goods under KH. Thus, including compensation or changes in income distribution 
as economic goods requires no interpersonal utility comparisons beyond the pre-existing 
requirement to treat all equally (Zerbe, 1998).  
We raise the question of whether or not, in principle, KHM is better suited for welfare 
analysis than KH. We do not consider measurement issues.
9 We suggest that the arguments 
advanced against including moral sentiments are incorrect or unpersuasive and that there are 
advantages to KHM over KH.  
 
3. A Definition of Moral Sentiments  
 
By “moral sentiments” we mean those involving concern for other beings or entities. The 
focus of debate has been moral sentiments that involve concern for humans. These moral 
sentiments also include immoral sentiments, as might arise when one wishes harm to others. One 
may care about others as a result of kinship, empathy, envy or hatred, or as a matter of justice. 
Charity is an expression of moral sentiment. One may care about the utility function of others; 
this is called non-paternalistic altruism. One may care about others from one’s own perspective, 
as when a parent requires a child to eat spinach when the child would rather not; this is called 
paternalistic altruism. One may have an existence value for goods unrelated to their use or for 
goods based on their use or appreciation by others that can reflect paternalistic altruism, non-
paternalistic altruism, or both. According to Johansson (1992), it would not be uncommon for 
non-use values such as bequest values and benevolence toward friends and relatives to account 
                                                 
8  Zerbe (2001) has called for a more detailed and refined version of KHM under the rubric KHZ. A project will pass 
the KHZ criterion when (1) the sum of the WTPs for a change exceeds the sum of the absolute value of the WTAs; 
(2) all values count, or, more precisely and as with KHM, all goods and sentiments for which there is a WTP are 
regarded as economic goods; (3) gains and losses are measured by WTP and WTA, respectively, and from a 
psychological reference point that is determined largely by legal rights; and (4) transaction costs of operating within 
a set of rules (but not the costs of changing rules) are included in determining efficiency.  (This latter assumption is 
necessary to define inefficiency; otherwise all arrangements are tautologically efficient.) The KHZ measure makes 
explicit the necessary connection between an efficiency criterion and the legal system. KHZ also views benefit-cost 
analysis as supplying information relevant to the decision, not as supplying the decision itself. The rationale for 
these assumptions and their consequences for legal analysis may be found in Zerbe (2001).   4
for 50-75% of the total WTP for an environmental project. In economic terms we will say that 
moral sentiments exist when there is a WTP for them.  
 
4. Arguments Against the Inclusion of Moral Sentiments in Benefit-Cost Analysis  
 
There are three principal arguments against including moral sentiments in benefit-cost 
analysis.  The first is that doing so produces inconsistencies with the Potential Compensation 
Test (PCT) that lies at the heart of KH-based benefit-cost analysis (Winter, 1969; Milgrom, 
1993). The second is that such inclusion can result in double counting.  The third, which we 
address first, arises from an invariance claim.  
 
Invariance 
The invariance claim is that non-paternalistic altruism is unimportant because such 
sentiments simply reinforce the conclusions that would be reached otherwise. In particular, as 
McConnell (1997, p. 27) notes, a project that “fails the original test with beneficiaries…will also 
fail when it incorporates the willingness to pay of those who are altruistic towards the direct 
beneficiaries.” The idea is that consideration of altruism only adds fuel to the fire if the project 
fails to generate net benefits for the supposed beneficiaries. Similarly, a project that passes the 
original benefit-cost test will pass a fortiori when it includes positive altruistic sentiments.  (It is 
recognized that this invariance claim does not hold when it includes negative altruism.)  This 
invariance claim is also derived by Bergstrom (1982), Johansson (1992, 1993), Jones-Lee 
(1992), Madariaga and McConnell (1987), McConnell (1997), Milgrom (1993), and Quiggen 
(1997).  
The claim is correct for homogenous groups, but even in this case it fails as a guide to 
inclusion of moral sentiments. The sign of a project’s net benefits may be invariant to inclusion 
of moral sentiments, but the magnitude of net benefits is not, and the magnitude of net benefits 
can have policy relevance. This point is not always recognized. For example, McConnell (1997, 
p. 25) notes, “[I]n the standard case, when the benefits of resource preservation to users exceed 
the costs, consideration of non-use benefits is superfluous as long as they are not negative.” Yet 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 Consideration of measurement issues would unduly expand the length of this paper and divert attention from the 
issues of principle we discuss.   5
inclusion of altruism may affect the ranking of projects being compared and thus affect which 
project is chosen. This is true even when the net present value without moral sentiments is 
already negative—meaning that including moral sentiments would further reduce the net present 
value—because one may be constrained to make recommendations among projects that all have 
negative net present values. Including moral sentiments can therefore contribute useful 
information.  
Moreover, the inclusion of non-paternalistic altruism can change the sign of net benefits 
in cases involving heterogeneous groups. Suppose, for example, that a project benefits a group of 
users U but fails a benefit-cost test because of negative impacts on a group of taxpayers T.  
Altruistic feelings for group U (by a group of altruists A, or even by group T) can change the 
sign of net benefits. Their inclusion will reverse the sign of the project’s net benefits as long as 
the altruistic sentiments are sufficiently large. Similarly, a project that benefits T but imposes net 
costs on U may pass a standard benefit-cost test but fail a test that includes group A’s altruistic 
feelings for U.
10 In general, inclusion of moral sentiments can reverse the sign of net benefits 
when the net benefits to those users who are the object of altruism are different in sign from the 
total of net benefits.  
 
Double Counting 
The double counting criticism centers on the argument that altruists could simply make 
cash transfers to the targets of their altruism instead of supporting projects that benefit those 
individuals. The double counting criticism therefore goes further than simple invariance to cover 
the case when ordinary net benefits to users are positive: Diamond and Hausman (1993, 1994) 
and McConnell (1997, p. 23) claim that including existence value when it arises as non-
paternalistic altruism is double counting.
11 McConnell considers projects in which the benefits to 
users are less than the costs of the project, and states that “the project will never pay, no matter 
what the sharing arrangement.”  
Consider, for simplicity, that users bear none of the project’s cost. McConnell suggests 
that even when benefits to users, BU, are positive, it is unnecessary to count non-paternalistic 
                                                 
10 Another possibility is that negative altruism could shift a benefit-cost test from negative to positive if the project 
fails to generate net benefits for the supposed beneficiaries. 
11 The Diamond and Hausman claim is a bit more general, but McConnell shows that the claim is properly limited to 
only non-paternalistic altruism.    6
moral sentiments and that doing so leads to double counting.  He compares the project to a direct 
transfer of cash from the general public (here, the altruists) to users. Since direct transfer to users 
of some amount less than the cost of the project, C, is cheaper than the project while creating 
equivalent moral sentiments, counting benefits representing moral sentiments will distort the 
choice. More precisely, McConnell notes (p. 29) that instead of undertaking the project it would 
always be better to give the beneficiaries a cash payment equal to BU + ∆ for any positive 
transfer ∆ such that BU + ∆ < C. 
It is possible, however, to expand this result to the more realistic case in which there is a 
cost to making cash payments. When this is done, it becomes necessary to include moral 
sentiments. McConnell assumes that cash payments can be made without cost, so that transaction 
costs and deadweight tax costs are zero. Instead, let φ be the loss per dollar of attempted transfer, 
meaning that (1- φ) reaches the user and φ is lost in administrative and other costs associated 
with the transfer. The amount that will have to be paid in cash in order for users to receive the 
same benefits as the project is BU/(1- φ). This cash payment will be superior to the project only if 
BU/(1- φ) < C. Whether or not direct payment to users is more efficient than the project depends 
on the cost of transferring money directly and the amount by which the cost of the project 
exceeds the benefits to its users. The larger the costs of transferring money, or the smaller the 
divergence between the cost of the project and its benefits to users, the more likely it is that the 
project will be superior to a direct cash transfer. In terms of McConnell’s argument, providing 
users with BU + ∆ in cash requires altruists to pay (BU+ ∆)/(1- φ), and this is necessarily superior 
to a project with cost C only if (BU+ ∆)/(1- φ) < C. The fact that BU < C does not ensure that this 
requirement is met unless φ = 0. For example, if φ = 0.5 then the project’s benefit to users would 
need to be less than 50% of the cost of the project for direct payment to be superior. If benefits to 
users were 90% of costs, the project would be superior for any transfer cost greater than 10% (φ 
=0.1).  
 Furthermore, it will never be the case that counting moral sentiments results in double 
counting. This is because the WTP for the project depends on the availability of substitutes, a 
point that has not been recognized by previous commentators. One such substitute is for altruists 
to provide a direct transfer to users. In order to provide benefits of BU to users, the altruists need 
to allocate BU/(1- φ), so the net social cost of the direct transfer is:   7
(BU) (φ)/(1- φ),          (1) 
When φ is zero, the price of the direct transfer substitute is zero. As one will not pay 
more for a good than its cost elsewhere, the WTP for the project will be zero. In this case there is 
no double counting as the benefits from moral sentiments are zero. For any φ > 0, there will be a 
benefit from the moral sentiments. As φ approaches one, the price of the direct transfer project in 
which income is transferred from altruists to users approaches infinity.  
  There will be, then, an existence value from the project’s benefits to users when 
and only when there are no perfect substitutes available at a lower price. A positive existence 
value doesn’t violate the invariance result and is entirely consistent with McConnell’s model 
once transactions costs are introduced. To include it in benefit-cost evaluations will not result in 
double counting; it is a real value that should be included in the benefit-cost calculus.  
 We conclude that it is necessary to count moral sentiments to know if benefits exceed 
costs as well as to know the magnitude of net benefits.
12 The technical arguments against its 
inclusion are unpersuasive. 
 
5. The Potential Compensation Problem with Including Moral Sentiments  
 
Perhaps the strongest argument that economists have against including non-paternalistic 
moral sentiments is concern that inclusion can lead to acceptance of projects that do not pass the 
Potential Compensation Test (Milgrom, 1993). The PCT requires that winners from a project are 
hypothetically able to compensate the losers while retaining some of their gains. No actual 
compensation is required.  
Milgrom (1993) argues that including non-paternalistic moral sentiments in benefit-cost 
analysis leads to potential violations of the PCT. He considers a project that costs $160 and 
affects two people. Individual U, the user, gains $100 from the project and bears none of its 
costs.  Individual A, the altruist, has a gross gain of $50 + 0.5 times U's net surplus, i.e., a gross 
gain of $100; A also bears the entire $160 cost of the project, for a net loss of $60. The project 
                                                 
12 The issue of double counting is treated elegantly at the level of a social welfare function by Johansson (1992). He 
shows that altruistic values will already be included in questionnaires to determine the optimum provision of a 
public good. The difficulty in ignoring altruism means that in a practical sense it is better to include it than to ignore 
it. 
   8
passes a benefit-cost test if altruism is included, but fails if altruism is excluded. (The net 
benefits are $200-$160=$40 and $150-$160= -$10, respectively). Less evident is that the project 
fails the PCT: each dollar that U gives A in compensation provides a net benefit to A of only 
$0.50, so even transferring U's entire $100 gain cannot overcome A's initial net loss of $60. 
Milgrom concludes that altruism and other moral sentiments should not be included in benefit-
cost analysis. 
We argue below that this is the wrong conclusion, but first we examine the extent to 
which moral sentiments may lead to inconsistencies with the PCT. Imagine that there is a project 
with benefits and costs distributed between users U and altruists A. Let α be the "warm glow" 
experienced by the altruists from each $1 increase in U's net benefits. Aside from altruism, direct 
net benefits from the project are NBA and NBU for A and U, respectively. We assume that the 
sum of these is negative. A also gets indirect altruistic benefits based on the net benefits to U. 
These are measured by A’s WTP, which is $α per $1 net benefit to U. Therefore, the total net 
benefits including altruism are  
NBU + NBA+α(NBU).    (2) 
The net benefits (including altruism) to A are 
NBA+α(NBU),     (3) 
which we assume to be negative. To pass the PCT, U must be able to compensate A with some 
transfer T; the minimum acceptable transfer satisfies 
NBA+T+α(NBU-T)=0.  (4) 
Solving for T shows that applying this hypothetical transfer to A will result in total net benefits 
of 
  ( N B U –T)=(NBA+NBU)/(1-α), (5) 
which will be negative for 0< α <1 since the numerator is assumed to be negative. Thus it is said 
that to pass a PCT, benefits should exceed costs without considering moral sentiments.  
However, ordinary net benefits need not be positive to pass the PCT when α >1; we can 
compensate A by having him give money to U. Suppose, for example, that A transfers $200 to U 
at a cost of $210. This does not pass the ordinary benefit-cost test. But if A gains two dollars in 
satisfaction for every dollar transferred to U, then the gains to A are $400-$210 or $190; in this 
case the project passes a benefit-cost test counting moral sentiments and also the PCT since there 
are no losers.   9
 It is useful to distinguish between αi, which represents the altruism of an individual, and 
α, which is this value summed over all altruists. Since the number of altruists can be very large, 
α  can also be very large, reflecting the fact that moral satisfaction has qualities similar to public 
goods.
13 Consider, for example, a situation in which 200 altruists are charged $1 each to transfer 
$200 to users. If the value of αi is $0.10 (i.e., each altruist gets a gross benefit of $0.10 for each 
dollar transferred), then α will be 20 and the altruistic gain will be $4000. Values of α<1 are 
unlikely except in cases where moral sentiments are unimportant, in the sense of being either 
restricted to a few people, or weak, or both. 
More generally, consider the conditions under which a transfer project counting moral 
sentiments would pass KHM but fail the PCT. If C is the amount of the attempted transfer and φ 
is the cost or waste per dollar of attempted transfer, the gains to the users will be (C - φC) and the 
gains to the altruists will be α(C- φC) -C. A necessary condition for failing the PCT is that the 
gains of the altruists be negative, which will be true only if α < 1/(1-φ); this in turn implies that α 
< 1 is a necessary condition for failing the PCT. Next, note that the project will pass KHM as 
long as total net gains, C(1 - φ)(1+ α) -C, are positive, which will be true as long as α > φ/(1 - φ). 
If α < 1 then this implies φ <0.5 (waste less than 50%), so both α < 1 and φ <0.5 are necessary 
conditions for a project to be accepted under KHM and fail the PCT. This is a narrow range, 
especially because α will be greater than 1 as long as there are a number of altruists with modest 
altruistic sentiments. Milgrom (1993) assumes that φ = 0 and that there is only one altruist, with 
αi =α= 0.5. If instead there are 15 altruists, each with αi= 0.1, then we will have α = 1.5 and it 
                                                 
13 We have treated α as a constant, following Milgrom (1993). It will not be. Rather, as with any good, the marginal 
value of moral satisfaction will fall as more is purchased, so that α will be a declining function of the amount 
transferred from altruists to users. The social optimum requires that transfers take place as long as α is greater than 
the transfer cost per dollar. That is, welfare is maximized if transfers from altruists to users continue until α = φ/(1-
φ), where φ is the waste per dollar of attempted transfer.   Pure transfer projects, which have ordinary net benefits of 
zero, will pass the PCT as long as 
_
α , the average value of α, is greater than the average cost of the transfer, even if 
at the margin α is less than the cost per dollar transfer. The value of 
_
α  may be found by integrating the demand for 
moral satisfaction from T= 0 to the optimal T, T*, and then dividing the result by the amount transferred, T*. In this 
case both users and altruists gain from the transfer. For projects in which moral sentiments are significant it will 
likely be the case that 
_
α > φ/(1-φ). Thus transfer projects will pass the PCT. As with the social optimum for any 
public good, the quantity of transfers is determined where the marginal cost of transfers, φ/(1-φ), intersects the 
aggregate demand curve. Note that this is a social welfare maximization result, not the result from individual choice 
by altruists. The price paid and the satisfaction gained will be different for each individual. An individual altruist 
would transfer an additional dollar to users only as long as that altruist’s warm glow, αi, was greater than 1/(1-φ) .    10
will be impossible to replicate Milgrom’s example.
14 Thus, projects that include moral 
sentiments will pass a KHM and fail the PCT only in trivial cases.  
 
6. The PCT: Problems with Excluding Moral Sentiments  
 
The previous section showed that including moral sentiments in benefit-cost analysis can 
lead to inconsistencies with the PCT. This section shows that excluding moral sentiments can 
also lead to inconsistencies with the PCT. The combination of these results raises fundamental 
questions about the usefulness of the PCT.  
   Returning to Milgrom’s example of a $160 project that provides users U with 
$100 in benefits, suppose that altruists bear the entire cost of the project but also have gross 
benefits of $40 + 1.5 times U's net surplus. This project would pass a PCT because there's no 
need for compensation: U has net benefits of $100 and A has net benefits of $40 + (1.5)($100) - 
$160 = $30. Excluding altruism, however, the project still doesn't pass KH. Thus KH can reject a 
project that passes the PCT.  
More strikingly, in this example KH rejects the project even though both A and U gain. 
Following Milgrom's advice therefore leads us afoul of what may be the most fundamental 
principle of benefit-cost analysis: never pass up an opportunity to make a Pareto improvement.  
In addition, we note that failure to pass the PCT can apply also to KH. For over twenty 
years it has been known that a positive sum of compensating variations, the standard benefit-cost 
test, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the passage of a compensation test 
(Boadway and Bruce, 1984). Symmetrically, the sum of equivalent variations is a sufficient but 
not a necessary condition for passage of such a test. The CV test will lead to the approval of 
projects that fail the compensation test; the EV test will lead to the rejection of projects that pass 
the compensation test.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
14 We have not addressed the issue of the allocation of the costs among users and altruists. As long as α >0 then 
costs should be shifted to altruists. This is because the cost to them of an additional dollar is less than a dollar as 
long as α >0. As more of the costs are borne by altruists α will fall and further transfers would be inefficient once α 
= 0. The value of α relevant for the determination of benefits to altruists is its average value. As long as this average 
value is greater than 1, the PCT is passed.  
   11
Finally, Baker (1980, p. 939) has pointed out a legally relevant failure of KH to pass a 
PCT. He notes that when rights are in dispute, the usual case in matters at law, the sum of the 
expectations of the parties will normally exceed the value of the right so that no potential 
compensation is possible. For example, suppose a piece of property is worth $120 to Ronald and 
$100 to Richard. The ownership of this property is in dispute between Richard and Ronald but 
each believes with 80 percent probability that he owns the property. The total value of 
expectations is $176 and the winner could not in principle compensate the loser. If the property 
is awarded to Ronald, he has a gain of $24, which is not sufficient to compensate Richard, who 
suffers a loss of $80. As long as the sum of expected values is greater than the actual value, the 
project cannot pass the PCT. Baker maintains that the inability to determine the efficient 
allocation is an indictment of benefit-cost analysis generally and of KH in particular.
15  
Altogether, these arguments call into question the value of the PCT. The argument for 
dropping the PCT is that it does no work for us that is not already done by the KHM criterion 
that net benefits should be positive. The fact that a project passes the PCT does not mean that 
losers can actually be compensated. Actual compensation is not costless, so actual compensation 
can take place only if the net gains are sufficient to cover both the compensation of losers and the 
cost of making the compensation. Thus the PCT cannot claim the virtue of providing for actual 
compensation when desired. Moreover, this sort of information about compensation is valuable 
only if we value moral sentiments.  
The moral basis of KH, rather, lies in the powerful argument that its use will increase 
wealth and will likely result in all, or at least most, groups gaining over time from its application 
so that losers in one period become winners in the next. This justification, however, applies, a 
fortiori, to KHM. Indeed, one common argument against KH is that it is dependent on income, 
so that low-income individuals are more likely to lose and, having lost, become ever more likely 
to lose in subsequent rounds (Richardson, 2000). This is less likely under KHM as long as there 




                                                 
15 Baker’s criticism doe not, however, apply to KHM.  What is important in KHM is whether net benefits are 
positive, not whether a potential compensation test is satisfied.     12
7. Why an Aggregate Measure Is Superior to KH  
 
We have shown that the use of KHM can, at least in principle, change both the sign and 
the magnitude of net benefits calculated under KH.  But is KHM superior to KH? As long as one 
accepts the moral premise of benefit-cost analysis—that it is the WTP that counts—the answer is 
“Yes” for a simple reason: KHM gives a more complete accounting of WTP.  
Another way of answering the question is to perform a benefit-cost analysis of the choice 
between KHM and KH.
16 In other words, we ask if a move from a world that uses KH to one that 
uses KHM would itself be supported by either KH or KHM. Users will gain from such a move, 
as KHM will justify altruists bearing more of the costs of projects. Altruists may lose if they bear 
more of the costs but by definition they will lose less than users gain. Thus such a move to the 
use of KHM is justified by KHM itself.  
The most compelling argument for KHM over KH is simply that KHM reveals more 
information about actual preferences and is thus more informative. That is, the basic argument is 
that KHM provides useful information not provided by KH. Consider the nuclear waste example 
below. 
 
8. An Extended Example: The Discount Rate Problem and Moral Harm 
 
In benefit-cost analysis, future benefits and costs are discounted using an interest rate 
termed the discount rate. Discounting brings up a number of issues, particularly when the 
discounting extends beyond the lives of the decision makers (Ahearne, 2000). Here we are 
concerned with only one—the widespread criticism of the use of discounting in benefit-cost 
analysis on the grounds that it is unethical to discount future generations’ benefits and costs (e.g., 
Parfit, 1992, 1994; Schultze et al., 1981). Critics argue that the utility of future generations 
should be on par with the utility of the present generation (Schultze et al., 1981; Pearce et al., 
1989). For example, Parfit (1992, p. 86) contends that “the moral importance of future events 
does not decline at n% per year.” Similarly, Brown (1990) notes that "discounting imperils the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 For reasons beyond the scope of this paper, Zerbe (2001) finds that KHZ is superior to both KH and KHM.     13
future by undervaluing it."
17 This sort of criticism has been noted with favor by economists (e.g., 
Schultze et al., 1981; Pearce et al., 1989), lawyers (Plater et al., 1998, pp. 107-109), and 
philosophers (Parfit, 1992, 1994). The following is an example of the sort of problem that 
concerns these critics: 
A nuclear project is being considered that produces benefits of about $100 
billion at a cost of about $60 billion but, in addition, produces a toxic time bomb 
that will cause enormous environmental costs sometime in the far future.
18 
Suppose that waste-disposal technology will contain this waste for 500 years, 
after which it will escape its sarcophagus and generate environmental damage of 
$263 trillion in constant current-year dollars. The present value of these damages 
discounted at a 3 percent real social rate of time preference (SRTP) is about $100 
million. This amount is not insignificant, but it is far less than the damage that 
will occur in 500 years and far too small to affect the results of the benefit-cost 
analysis. Discounting these damages then results in the project going forward as 
the benefits are determined to exceed the costs by almost $40 billion.  
It is said that this project would be unfair to future generations and therefore that the use 
of discounting in benefit-cost analysis is immoral. A commonly proposed solution to the problem 
of unethical harm to future generations is to use low, or even negative, discount rates (e.g., 
Schultze et al., 1981) or not to use discount rates at all (Parfit, 1994). This sort of argument is a 
moral plea about what our sentiments should be towards future generations, but not an effective 
statement about what or whether discount rates should be used or even about the relevant actual 
moral sentiments. The proposed solution of using no or low discount rates is ad hoc and, if 
generally applied, will lead to other ethical problems – for example, the adoption of projects that 
give less benefit to both present and future generations.
19  
                                                 
17 Shrader-Frechette has argued that both the decision and the process by which it is made require informed consent. 
This is not possible when decisions affect future generations. See Ahearne (2000). 
18 Cases in which this sort of issue have arisen include Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. 462 U.S. 87, (1983); and Pacific Gas and Electric Co et al. v. State Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, (1991). See also 123 U.S. 45 (1999). 
19 For example, consider two projects with initial costs of $100. Project A has benefits of $150 in the first period. 
Project B has benefits of $150 in 100 years. With negative or sufficiently low discount rates, project B is preferred. 
Project A, however, may result in greater wealth in 100 years so that it is superior for both current and future 
generations.    14
Under KHM we can give standing to moral sentiments of the present generation about 
future generations. This provides a solution to the ethical dilemma of the discount rate problem 
by acknowledging the validity of ethical concerns while also acknowledging the values that 
commend use of a discount rate.  
In Table 1 below, a standard KH benefit-cost approach is compared to KHM under three 
different options.
20 In one option, the current generation allocates enough funds to fully 
compensate the future generation. (We assume that the costs of such an allocation, including 
administrative costs, total $10 billion in present value terms.) In a second option, the current 
generation engages in mitigation efforts (such as creating a more secure holding container or 
shipping the waste into space) that eliminate the harm to future generations at a cost to current 
generations of $7.5 billion. The third option involves neither compensation nor mitigation.  
The WTP by the current generation to avoid the moral harm the project would cause to 
future generations is $50 billion. In KH moral harm is ignored so this value is not included. 
Going ahead with the project and providing neither compensation nor mitigation therefore gives 
the highest net present value (NPV) under KH. Under KHM, however, the NPV for this option is 
negative: consideration of moral harm reduces the NPV from $39.9 billion under KH to -$10.1 
billion under KHM. The KHM approach shows that the preferred alternative involves either 
compensation or mitigation, whichever is cheaper. If neither mitigation nor compensation is 
feasible, the project is rejected by KHM.  
One might object and say that moral harm cannot exceed the $100 million present value 
of the future loss. If the current generation can compensate future generations for $100 million, 
then wouldn’t this represent the maximum willingness to pay? The answer is no, for two reasons. 
First, the costs of compensating are clearly not $100 million. The administrative costs of 
providing compensation so far into the future must be included, and these may well be 
enormous, perhaps even infinite. The ability to provide the required long-lived institutions that 
would carry out compensation has been found to be improbable (Leschine and McCurdy, 2003). 
Second, the parties deciding on compensation may not be the same parties that suffer 
moral harm. That is, for goods supplied by the public, there is a distinction between those who 
would purchase moral satisfaction and those who make the decision to purchase it. The 
transactions costs of actually persuading the decision makers to compensate may be prohibitive, 
                                                 
20 A similar but not identical table is presented in Zerbe (2006).   15
especially since any attempt at agreement may suffer from a free rider problem.
21 If no purchase 
of moral satisfaction occurs, one must conclude that the transactions cost of purchase is at least 
as great as the moral harm to the present generations.  
KHM provides a solution to the ethical dilemma of the discount rate problem by 
acknowledging ethical concerns as valid and seeking an ethical solution while also 
acknowledging the values that commend use of a discount rate. Under KHM, the economic 
efficiency of the project depends on the sentiments of the present generation. For example, the 
present generation may find that compensation for environmental harm is unwarranted, given 
their belief that future generations will be wealthier than the present one. Or the present 
generation may feel that future generations should be free of problems caused by the current 
generation. Evidence from Kunreuther and Easterling (1992, p. 255) and from Svenson and 
Karlsson (1989) suggests that, at least as regards nuclear waste disposal, individuals tend to place 
a high weight on future consequences.  
It is not the amount of compensation actually required for those injured that is directly 
relevant here. Rather, it is the amount of compensation the current generation thinks is correct. 
This information could be determined, at least in principle, by a contingent valuation survey 
measuring the WTP or WTA of those who have moral sentiments about the project. 
 
9. Acceptability of KH and KHM  
 
No criticism of KH is more widespread than that it neglects distributional effects and 
moral sentiments (Zerbe, 1991). A representative view comes from the former Solicitor General 
of the United States, Charles Fried (1978, p. 93f), who sees the economic analysis of rights as 
using a concept of efficiency that is removed from distributional questions. He holds that 
economic analysis does not consider whether the distribution is fair or just, and concludes from 
this that efficiency does not provide “any privileged claim to our approbation” (1978, p. 94). The 
view that efficiency is unconcerned with distributional issues or with fairness is widespread in 
both law and economics (Zerbe, 1998, 2001). Adoption of an aggregate measure such as KHM 
would obviate this. Economists generally pay little attention to criticisms from outside the 
                                                 
21 Critics of benefit-cost analysis suggest that the values individuals hold as private persons differ from those they 
hold for public decision-making (Anderson, 1993, Sagoff, 1988). This argument, however, works better as a caution   16
profession. Yet if acceptance of our criterion by those outside the profession is important, these 




Quiggin (1997, p. 152f) usefully suggests four possible responses to the difficulties he 
and others raise regarding the inclusion of moral sentiments: (1) discard moral sentiments and 
non-use values and maintain that benefit-cost analysis furnishes a complete evaluation, (2) adopt 
an aggregate WTP criteria, replacing the usual distinction between equity and efficiency, (3) 
consider moral sentiments but only outside of benefit-cost analysis, and (4) ignore concern for 
others in general, but accept other forms of non-use value. To this choice set we add the 
possibility that we could (5) adopt an aggregate criterion that maintains the distinction between 
equity and non-equity goods. This paper has so far suggested dropping choices (1) and (4) and 
adopting choices (2) or (5). As for choice (3), we assume that it refers to the sentiments of many 
economists that KH should be used to determine efficiency and that considerations of the income 
distribution should be relegated to macroeconomics, where they may be more appropriately 
handled. In this case, choices (2) and (5) are superior to choice (3) for the following reasons: 
1. Some equity issues are not just matters of general income distribution and therefore 
cannot be handled well or at all by macroeconomic policy. For example, moral sentiments can 
address the effects of particular people being injured, altogether apart from sentiments about 
income distribution in general.  
2. There is no conflict between KHM and choice (3) when it is cheaper to achieve a 
particular result through macroeconomic policy. In this case the macro policy is a superior 
substitute for achieving moral satisfaction, so it eliminates consideration of the equity results of 
particular projects. As a result, equity effects can be ignored in many (but not all) cases. (If the 
project can achieve some desirable equity effect more cheaply than any  other policy, this 
advantages would show up in the benefit-cost analysis as part of the gain in moral sentiments.)  
3. In practice, the separation proposed in choice (3) means that economists will not 
address equity issues in the ordinary course of benefit-cost analyses. This means we will give 
                                                                                                                                                             
to measure the actual values than as a criticism of the methodology of benefit-cost analysis (Zerbe, 2001).    17
advice that is incorrect by our own standards, e.g., that we will reject projects that pass the Pareto 
test such as the example we gave earlier.  
4. Economics in general, and benefit-cost analysis in particular, has been widely and 
repeatedly criticized for this omission (Zerbe, 2001). The critical literature in philosophy and law 
is huge. There are reasons for economists to ignore much of this, but it is a mistake for the 
profession to not at least listen and make changes where warranted. The change we propose is 
arguably warranted and would enhance the standing of benefit-cost analysis.
22  
5. There is now a substantial literature (e.g. Andreoni, 1995; Andreoni and Payne, 2003), 
pointing out the importance of considering the effects of moral sentiments on economic 
behavior. 
No persuasive reason for ignoring moral sentiments in principle has been advanced. We 
have shown that there are examples in which their inclusion will improve the quality of analysis. 
We do not know of a single example in which their exclusion produces a superior analysis. The 
assumption by KH of an equal value for the marginal utility of money for all was made to allow 
British economists of the 1930s to make normative suggestions about the repeal of the Corn 
Laws. The decision to abandon the form of KH that ignores moral sentiments is equally justified 
today for a similar reason: we wish to make normative information available that is as useful as 




This paper has demonstrated that value is added by including moral sentiments in 
economic analysis and that the objections that have been raised to it are not persuasive. Of 
course, the ability to include such sentiments in practice is limited by the difficulty of 
measurement. But this is true of any values, particularly non-market ones, and not just moral 
ones.  
In the long run, it seems likely that an aggregate measure that includes moral sentiments 
will be adopted either in addition to or as a substitute to KH. As a practical matter, it is neither 
possible nor efficient for benefit-cost analysis to consider all relevant goods and affected 
                                                 
22 Even Richard Posner (1985) advocates including effects of moral sentiments on grounds that they are part of the 
market-based approach of benefit–cost analysis.   18
individuals, so any analysis will fail to meet the requirements of theoretical perfection, whether 
for KH or KHM. Nonetheless, in performing practical analysis it is always desirable to have in 
mind the best theoretical template so that practical decisions can be well-considered and not ad 
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Table 1: Comparison of KH and KHM* 
Present Values of Gains and Losses (in Billions) 
 
[1] [2]  [3] 












Mitigation Occurs  
 
 
Ordinary benefits  100 100  100
Ordinary costs to current 
generation 
-60 -60 -60
Harm to future generations  -0.1 -0.1  0
Cost of actual compensation  N/A -10  N/A
Mitigation costs  N/A  N/A  -7.5
Moral harm to present 
generation 
-50 0 0
KH NPV  39.9 29.9  32.5
KHM NPV  -10.1 29.9  32.5
Conclusion  Project is approved 
by KH but rejected 
by KHM because of 






      * Costs are indicated by a minus sign. Note that not all items are relevant to KH and that 
mitigation and compensation are substitutes so that one or the other but not both are included in 
the KHM calculation. 
 
 